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THE LOST PROMISE OF LAMBERT V. CALIFORNIA
Cynthia Alkon*
As others in the symposium will discuss, the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions are far-reaching and continue to impact
how criminal law is practiced in the United States. In contrast, the impact
of Lambert v. Californiai has been more limited and in many ways is a
story of a moment in history where one single Supreme Court case could
have sparked meaningful changes in our criminal legal system, but
didn't. The Court and the United States as a whole failed to live up to the
promise of Lambert.2
In Lambert, the Court held that the defendant's constitutional due
process rights were violated when the defendant was convicted for
failing to register as a convicted felon.3 Lambert is a relatively short case
and has been described as "replete with unhelpful and largely irrelevant
meanderings and.., frustratingly unclear on the scope of its fair notice
principle."4 Despite this, legal scholars initially held out great hope that
Lambert would begin an era of limiting strict liability and increasing
scrutiny of the constitutionality of criminal statutes.5 Lambert was
decided before mass incarceration began6 and, had it lived up to the
* © 2020, Professor of Law, Director of the Criminal Law, Justice & Policy Program, Texas
A&M University School of Law. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law. B.A., San
Fransisco State University, magna cum laude. Thank you to my research assistant, Cecelia Morin.
1. Lambertv. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
2. Compare id., with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). One small example of the
difference: Lambert has been cited 3,327 times-while Gideon has been cited 29,331 times
(Westlaw, Oct. 20, 2019). This number is the total reported by Westlaw as of July 25, 2019. Id.
3. Lambert,355 U.S. at227.

4. Peter W. Low & Benjamin Charles Wood, Lambert Revisited, 100 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1616
(2014).
5. Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal
Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 383 (1966); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 433-35 (1958); Alan C. Michaels, ConstitutionalInnocence, 112 HARV. L. REV.
828, 858 (1999); Gerhard OW. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1104
(1958).
6. See, e.g., Jacob Kang-Brown et al., The New Dynamics of Mass Incarceration,VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, June 2018, at 1, 8, https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/
Publications/the-new-dynamics -of-mass-incarceration/legacy-downloads/the-new-dynamics-ofmass-incarceration-reportpdf ("After decades of stability, the U.S. incarceration rate increased
markedly between 1970 and 2000, growing by an average of 12 percent each year to reach a total

increase of about 400 percent-and the highest rate of incarceration in the world.").
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early hopes of scholars, could have played a role in moderating or
preventing mass incarceration. Lambert could have inspired the
beginning of an era where criminal laws were placed under meaningful
constitutional scrutiny and notice to a defendant about violating a law
was required before prosecution. Instead, the Court largely ignored both
concepts, and lower courts continue to interpret Lambert narrowly.
This Article will start with a brief overview of the Lambert case. It
will then discuss the differing views on how to interpret this relatively
short case. Next, it will review the cases citing to Lambert that illustrate
the narrow approach that courts have taken when applying this case.
Finally, it will offer some thoughts on how Lambert could have played a
role in preventing some of the excesses of mass incarceration, but failed.
I. OVERVIEW OF LAMBERT V. CALIFORNIA
The defendant, Virginia Lambert, was convicted of felony forgery.7
Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, it was "unlawful for
'any convicted person' to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of
more than five days without registering ....
"8 Ms. Lambert failed to

register, although she had been a resident of Los Angeles for over seven
years.9 Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.43(b), failure to
register was a "continuing offense, each day's failure constituting a
separate offense."io Ms. Lambert was convicted of failing to register,
placed on three years of probation, and ordered to pay a $250 fine.ii Ms.
Lambert alleged that her due process rights had been violated and, in
recounting the facts, the Court said, "[w]e must assume that appellant
had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register under this
ordinance, as she offered proof of this defense which was refused."12
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-four decision authored by Justice
Douglas, found in favor of Ms. Lambert and held that the Code's
registration requirements "violate the Due Process requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment"13 The Court, unlike the lower courts in
California, did not consider the ordinance to be a strict liability offense.14
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
57.

Lambert,355 U.S. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228-29. See also Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1607; Michaels, supra note 5, at 856-
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The Court instead focused on whether Ms. Lambert had "actual
knowledge of the duty to register."15 The Court also discussed that this
case "deal[s] ...with conduct that is wholly passive-mere failure to
register."16 The Court discussed the importance of notice as being
"[e]ngrained in our concept of due process ....
"17
Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices
Harlan and Whittaker.18 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
reasoning that a key factor was the defendant's omission to act. Justice
Frankfurter wrote: "[W]hat the Court here does is to draw a
constitutional line between a State's requirement of doing and not
doing.., a distinction that may have significance in the evolution of
common-law notions of liability, but is inadmissible as a line between
constitutionality and unconstitutionality."19
Justice Frankfurter went on to express concern that if this case were
more widely applied, "a whole volume of United States Reports would
be required to document in detail the legislation in this country that
would fall or be impaired."20 Justice Frankfurter ended with his wellknown line that this case would be an "isolated deviation ...a derelict
on the waters of the law."21 As will be discussed, Justice Frankfurter was
right. Lambert has largely stood in isolation and has not led to
widespread invalidation of existing statutory law on constitutional
grounds.22 And, as the next Part will discuss, some of the Justices joining
the majority forced the opinion away from a more far-reaching rationale
due to concern that Lambert could invalidate too many existing criminal
laws if the Court was not careful.
II. WHY NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
When the Justices first voted on the case, they held nine to zero in
favor of Ms. Lambert to reverse the appellate court decision. 23 Justice
Douglas wrote a draft opinion overturning the lower court due to the
municipal code provision being unconstitutionally vague, as the average

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Lambert,355 U.S. at 229.
Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 232.
Id.
See infra pt. V.
A.F. Brooke II, When Ignorance of the Law Became an Excuse: Lambert & Its Progeny, 19 AM.

J.CRIM.

L.279, 282 (1992).
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person would not know what the words "punishable as a felony"
meant.24 Justice Douglas questioned how an average person could

understand whether something was a felony or a misdemeanor after
observing that there were at least five different definitions of what may
be defined as a felony.25 In his draft opinion, Justice Douglas also wrote,
"the statutory standard 'punishable as a felony' is a snare for the average
man and therefore too vague to pass the requirements of Due Process."26
The void for vagueness rationale was not one the majority of the
Court was ready to accept due to concerns that it would have a wider
impact on other laws, including invalidating laws targeting repeat
offenders.27 Justice Clark expressed concern to Justice Douglas that this
reasoning would "wreck a host of state statutes such as habitual
criminal, harboring, misprision, and would cast a shadow on many old
and well-established common law rules, such as felony murder, common
law burglary, etc."28 Justice Clark said he would join the opinion if itwas
decided on notice grounds, specifically, it seemed, to limit the potential
impact of Lambert.29

To get a majority, Justice Douglas had to rewrite the opinion to
clearly avoid the feared impact on existing criminal laws. As a result,
when the final opinion was released, Justice Douglas was not expecting
that the case would have a far reaching impact.30 He feigned some
concern about Justice Frankfurter's dissent and wrote him a note asking
for an example of a statute that would be unconstitutional under
Lambert.31 When Justice Frankfurter didn't respond, Justice Douglas
wrote the following to Justice Black:
Since the announcement of [Frankfurter's] dissent, I have been
writing him asking him to give us just one citation of one other
statute which would be held unconstitutional.
It is now 11:40 AM, December 17th, and this has been going on for
nearly 24 hours. He has not yet sent me any citations, but if he does I
24. Id. at 283.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 283-84. Robert Gorman, one of Justice Tom Clark's clerks, was concerned this
rationale would invalidate "three-time loser" statutes. Id. (citing Memo No.2 from Robert P. Gorman
to Tom C. Clark at 2 (undated) (available in Archives, Box A64, Lambert File)).
28. Id. at285.
29. Id.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34 (illustrating his conversations with Justice
Frankfurter).
31. Brooke II, supra note 23, at 287-89.
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will rush it all down to you, because I know you must be as worried
about the devastating effect of Lambert... as I am.32
If the Court had decided on void for vagueness grounds, and if, as
Justice Clark and his law clerk feared, this invalidated habitual offender
laws, Lambert could have prevented some of the extraordinarily long
sentences that came to define mass incarceration, such as the threestrikes laws. But, as the memos make clear, Justice Douglas did not
expect that larger impact The majority of the Court did not support this
case being anything but narrowly decided. The majority did not support
deciding the case on void for vagueness grounds, and the majority
opinion did not clearly invalidate strict liability offenses.
III. EARLYHOPESABOUT LAMBERT'S IMPACT
Scholars who wrote about Lambert just after it was decided did not
have the benefit of reading Justice Douglas' memos.33 These scholars
arrived at their projections of what Lambert might mean despite the lack
of clarity in the opinion itself The analysis of these scholars also appears
to have been heavily influenced by larger ongoing conversations about
criminal justice reform at the time. Looking back with the benefit of
hindsight, these early articles, published the year after Lambert, were
more about the scholars' hopes about what Lambert could mean and less
about what the Court actually wrote or meant to do in the future.
Gerhard O.W. Mueller declared in 1958, at the beginning of his
article On Common Law Mens Rea, that "[o]ne hundred years of American
complacency in matters of mens rea... have come to an end with...
Lambert v. California."34 Mueller went on to say that "[i]n the field of
criminal law no question occupies today's scholars, reformers and
legislators as much as that of the mental element of crime, mens rea."35
Mueller was right about the importance of mens rea at the time. The
American Law Institute was in the middle of a decade-long process to
draft the Model Penal Code (MPC), which had begun in 1952.36 The
MPC's greatest and most lasting influence was its approach to mens rea,
32. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Letterfrom William 0. Douglas to Hugo Black (December 17, 1957), in
THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, 87 (Melvin I.
Urofsky ed., 1987); Brooke II, supra note 23, at 288 (explaining the circumstances behind the letter
from William 0. Douglas to Hugo Black from December 17, 1957).
33. The memos were published later. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 32, at 87.
34. Mueller, supra note 5, at 1043.
35. Id. at 1045.
36. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1962).
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or the "General Requirements of Culpability."37 It would have been
difficult for criminal law scholars of the time to avoid viewing Lambert
through the "mens rea lens" promulgated by the ongoing MPC drafting
process.
Mueller discussed the ongoing conversations about mens rea,
observing that "[t]he interest is world wide" and that "no topic of the
criminal law is more hotly debated" in Western Europe.38 Mueller said,
"even in the Soviet Union, an astonishing ration of printer's ink and
paper has been apportioned for scholarly excursus on the topic."39
Mueller believed the developing scientific understanding of the "human
psyche" was a key to crime control and therefore needed to be better
understood as part of the evolving concept of the mental state required
for crime.40 Mueller concluded that Lambert had to be decided in the
defendant's favor as "true criminality requires proof of awareness of
wrongfulness."41 Mueller focused on the part of Douglas' opinion about
notice and the need for a person to be aware of the duty to do something,
as "'where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he
may not be convicted consistently with due process.'"42
Mueller criticized the dissenting Justices as they "completely failed
to appreciate the moral issue of mens rea.... "43 In Mueller's view, there
would be no need to overhaul or rewrite existing statutes. Instead, the
courts should simply interpret what he describes as the "mandate of
common law mens rea," which meant that mens rea was a "universal
requirement" regardless of the wording in the individual statute.44 The
only statutes that would need to be declared unconstitutional would be
those that specifically "abolish a universal mens rea requirement"45
Mueller conceded that this is not what Lambert said and that the
decision was "not a sweeping condemnation of all absolute criminal
liability, but a carefully limited ban covering all offenses of omission in
which ... the defendant was not, and could not [have] be[en], aware of
any wrong-doing."46 However, Mueller said that Lambert "unmistakably
points the way in the right direction and will ultimately lead to a
37.

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 140 (7th ed. 2015).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Mueller, supra note 5, at 1045.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1102-03 (citing Lambertv. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957)).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
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complete moral recovery of our penal law."47 Mueller ended his article

with the optimistic statement that "the Supreme Court has clearly told
us that it detests the immoral use or misuse of the criminal sanction in
the case of a morally blameless defendant ....
Absolute criminal liability
is beginning to end in America."48
A more senior professor at the time, Henry M. Hart Jr., shared
Mueller's concern about strict liability crimes but was more cautious
about Lambert's impact49 Hart's article, The Aims of the Criminal Law,
was a forceful argument against strict liability, and his comments were
directed at the on-going Model Penal Code drafting process.50 In
Lambert, according to Hart, the Court belatedly "discover[ed] that the
due process clauses had anything to say about branding innocent people
as criminals."51 Hart was critical of Douglas's reasoning in the opinion,
as the majority "made no effort to analyze the nature of crimes of
omission, as distinguished from those of commission."52 Hart noted that
the four dissenting votes were "led by so sensitive a judge as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter .... "53 Hart and Frankfurter were friends. Hart had been
Frankfurter's student and dedicated the first edition of his book, Federal
Courts, to Frankfurter.54 However, this relationship did not stop Hart
from criticizing the dissent as it "did not have the virtue even of the
majority's muddy recognition that being a 'criminal' must mean
something."55 Hart did not share Frankfurter's concern about the impact
of Lambert as "[t]he importance of constitutional doctrine is not to be
measured by the number of statutes formally invalidated pursuant to it
or formally sustained against direct attack."56
Hart was less convinced that Lambert would have the far-reaching
effect that he (and Mueller) wanted. Hart advised that "what will be
chiefly important to watch about the Lambert case will be the strength
of the push it gives to interpretations insisting upon the necessity of a
genuinely criminal intent"57 Hart again criticized how the majority

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1043 n.*(providing that Mueller was an associate professor of law in 1958); see infra
note 50 (providing that Hart was a professor of law in 1958).

50. Hart, supra note 5, at 422.
51. Id. at 433.
52. Id. at 434.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
HENRY HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
Hart, supra note 5, at 434.
Id. at435.
Id.
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opinion was written as "the push would have been stronger if the
majority opinion had been more muscularly written."58
Hart focused in on one point that Mueller did not: the need for
better direction by courts to legislatures in terms of how they were
drafting criminal laws. Hart described the "shoddy and little-minded
thinking of American legislatures about the problems of the criminal law
.... "59 To Hart, the legislatures needed better direction from the courts,
as he said, "[o]nly if the courts acknowledge their obligation to
collaborate with the legislature in discerning and expressing the
unifying principles and aims of the criminal law is it likely that a
coherent and worthy body of penal law will ever be developed in this
country."60 Hart was not convinced that Lambert was the case to give
legislatures that better direction. As he said, "[f]or the most part,
American courts have, thus far, failed not only in the fulfillment, but even
in the recognition of th[e] obligation" to collaborate with legislatures.61
IV LATER VIEWS OF LAMBERT
In the immediate years after the decision, Lambert was looked to as
a case that would mark the beginning of a new era of constitutional
criminal doctrine.62 However, Lambert did not live up to the hopes of
these earlier scholars that it would be the first of many cases to develop
robust constitutional limits for criminal law or to eliminate strict liability
offenses. In fact, the number of strict liability offenses, particularly under
federal laws, has multiplied.63 In the decades after the decision, scholars
have developed other views of how to interpret Lambert once it became
clear that Lambert was not having its hoped-for impact. As Peter Low
and Benjamin Wood observed, "Lambert has been the source of much
puzzlement since it was handed down, and a consensus on its ultimate
import has yet to be reached."64 This Part reviews these different views.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 435-36.
61. Id. at 436.
62. See, e.g., Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1617.
63. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt
Declines, WALL ST. J. Sept. 27, 2011, https://www.wsj.com/artides/SB1000142405311
1904060604576570801651620000.
64. Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1617.
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A. Omission to Act
The narrow view of Lambert is that it prohibits strict liability crimes
that are mala prohibita crimes of omission.65 Lambert is a popular case
in first year criminal law casebooks for this proposition.66 Lambert is
often taught as part of the introduction to actus reus and omission to act
and is given as an example of a case where the Court overruled a
conviction due to lack of notice to the defendant that she needed to do
an affirmative act (register) to avoid a criminal violation.67 However,
Justice Douglas, after noting that Lambert deals with a "wholly passive"
act, stated that it is "unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act
under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed."68 This line has been interpreted by scholars to mean that
Lambert should be viewed as applying to both affirmative acts and to
omissions to act.69 Under this analysis, the key fact to focus on is
Lambert's lack of notice regarding what is criminal behavior (whether it
is an affirmative act or omission to act).7o Although other scholars have
focused on whether, in fact, Lambert was "wholly passive" when she
acted affirmatively by staying in Los Angeles.71
B. Ignorance of the Law
Another view is that Lambert disproves the maxim that "ignorance
of the law is no excuse."72 Under this analysis, if the law is one that most
people would not know about (such as a requirement to register as a
felon), and there is no notice to the individual defendant about the
existence of the law, then ignorance of the law could be a defense.73 Some
academics have said that Lambert "might stand for a limited
constitutional notice principle."74 The challenge to this analysis of

65. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 457-58 n.288 (1993) and discussion in Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1617.
66.

ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING, ALFREDO GARCIA & CYNTHIA E. JONES, CRIMINAL LAW:

CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE, 206-08 (4th ed. 2018).
67. See e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 193-98 (6TH ed. 2008);
MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTS 35354 (2ND ed., 2009).
68. Lambertv. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
69. Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1618.
70. Id.
71. Michaels, supra note 5, at 861.
72. Id. at 859-60; Brooke II, supra note 23, at 280.
73. Brooke II, supranote 23, at 286-87.
74. Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1618-20.
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Lambert is the subsequent caselaw that makes it clear that, in other
circumstances, knowledge is not required.75
C. "Lack of Blameworthiness"
Blameworthiness is the idea that a person should only be held
accountable if the punishment would be "just," which would only
happen if the defendant were to "blame" for the conduct 76 In giving this
explanation, Professor (now Dean) Michaels focuses on a line in
Lambert77 from Holmes, which says, "[a] law which punished conduct
which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the
community would be too severe for that community to bear."78 This view
suggests that Lambert stands for the proposition that strict liability
crimes, when a person would not otherwise know it is a crime, would be
unconstitutional. However, Michaels points out that there is a
"substantial body of case law indicating that strict liability is not
unconstitutional."79

D. Socialization
A related concept is socialization. This is premised on the idea that
"criminal law is heavily fault-oriented, in principle punishing bad
choices."8o This means that when a person is not "sufficiently at fault"
they should not be held to be responsible, especially if they "did not
make a bad choice."81 Peter Low and Benjamin Wood argue that
socialization is part of the common-law doctrines of mistake of fact and
ignorance of the law.82 Low and Wood do not conclude whether
negligence, recklessness, or knowledge should be the culpability
standard for mistakes of fact, but they argue that "strict liability for
factual mistake ought to be unacceptable."83

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Michaels, supra note 5, at 860.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Lambertv. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
Michaels, supra note 5, at 861-62 (emphasis in original).
Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1621.
Id.
Id. at 1622-28.
Id. at 1624.
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Low and Wood use Liparota v. United States84 as an example of
socialization "in [f]act" by the Supreme Court85 In this case, the
defendant bought food stamps from an undercover agent for less than
their face value.86 The relevant law required that the defendant
"knowingly" transfer food stamps in "any manner not authorized."87 The
Court held that "the Government must prove that the defendant knew
that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner
unauthorized by statute or regulations."88 The Court did not cite to
Lambert, but Low and Wood use this case as an example of using
socialization to prevent the application of the principle that "ignorance
of the criminal law is not an excuse."89 Further,
there is no Supreme Court decision of which we are aware that has
brought Lambert into this kind of service on a statutory construction
issue involving the appropriate level of fault in a criminal case. It
must be, therefore, that Lambert is not widely perceived, at least by
the Supreme Court, as stating a broadly applicable socialization
principle that places a heavy constitutional thumb on the scale of
everyday mens rea interpretations in the criminal law.9o
E. "Right to Travel Case"
Michaels suggests that Lambert is instead a "right-to-travel case."91
Michaels' analysis focuses on the affirmative act of being in Los Angeles
and that to limit this act (by requiring registration) interfered with
Lambert's constitutional right to travel.92 Michaels argues that this
analysis is the only one that makes sense when comparing Lambert to
United States v. Balint93 and United States v. Dotterweich.94 Those cases
both involved drugs-selling narcotics "while 'innocently' not having
the requisite form," and shipping drugs in interstate commerce "while
'innocently' mislabeling the ingredients."95 In Michaels' view, the

84.
85.
86.
87.

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1641-42.
Liparota,471 U.S. at 419.
Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2018)).

88. Id. at 433.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1642 -43.
Id. at 1647.
Michaels, supra note 5, at 862.
Id.
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
320 U.S. 277 (1943); Michaels, supra note 5, at 842-49.
Michaels, supra note 5, at 864.
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element of travel is the distinguishing feature of Lambert.96 While it may
be a distinguishing feature, as Michaels acknowledges, the Court itself
never gave this reason.97
V. HOW THE COURTS HAVE USED LAMBERT
Since it was decided, Lambert has been cited in a total of 825 cases
in federal and state courts.98 As Douglas predicted, it is hard to find an
example of any statute that has been invalidated due to Lambert, even
sixty-two years later. Examples of defendants prevailing due to Lambert
are also a small overall percentage. As will be discussed below, the
defendant won in just twenty-two of the 825 cases (2.6% of the total).
Lambert is a case that is more often cited to uphold the application of a
law against a defendant than to invalidate a statute.
In the years immediately following Lambert, lower courts did not
jump to read Lambert broadly. Instead, they were cautious and applied
Lambert narrowly. For example, in United States v. Juzwiak, the Second
Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction for leaving the United States
without registering under the federal narcotic registration statute.99 In
Reyes v. United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's
conviction for violating the same statute as in the Juzwiak case.o These
cases took a narrow view of Lambert, due to the "lack of clarity" in the
majority opinion.ol The concurring opinion in Juzwiak also observed
that "the Lambert case disclosed so sharp a division in the Court that the
extension of its policy to new areas may well be thought unlikely."102
Lower courts did not seem to try to see how far they could push the
Supreme Court in terms of limiting strict liability crimes.
A. Lambert in the Federal Courts
A total of 451 federal cases have cited to Lambert. Of these, there
are just sixteen cases (3.5% of cases) where the defendant cited to

96. Id. at 864-66.
97. Id. at 865.
98. This number is the total reported by Lexis as of April 30, 2019.
99. 258 F.2d 844, 847 (2d Cir. 1958).
100. 258 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1958).
101. Frank C. Bozeman, Comment, Mens Rea and Strict Liability CriminalStatutes, 16 WASH. &LEE
L. REv. 238, 247 (1959).
102. Juzwiak, 258 F.2dat 848 (Clark, J.,concurring).
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Lambert and prevailed (at least in some measure) due to Lambert.lo3
Those thirteen cases, for the most part, focused on failures to register,
omissions to act, and notice issues. Interestingly, of the thirteen cases,
the earliest was in 1970-thirteen years after Lambert was decided.
Of the federal cases where Lambert was used and the defendant did
not prevail, nearly 20% (eighty-seven cases) were sex offenses, with
over 86% of those cases being sex-offender registry cases.104 It is not
surprising that defendants are not prevailing using Lambert in sex
offender registry cases as there are rarely problems with notice in those
cases. Defendants who are subject to sex offender registration are
usually advised on the record, as part of the plea deal, and it is
specifically stated as a term of probation (if there is probation). Nearly
10% of the federal cases citing to Lambert involved firearm offenses,
including unlawful possession of a firearm due to status (such as being
a felon).
B. Lambert in the State Courts
A total of 375 state court cases have cited to Lambert. Of these, the
defendant prevailed in just six cases (1.6% of cases).1o5 These six cases
overwhelmingly involved notice issues. At the state level, one of the six
cases was decided in 1960-just three years after Lambert was decided.
However, that case was a direct response to Lambert and held that the
city did not have the constitutional power to enact the municipal

103. See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963); Smith v. Roe, 159 F. App'x 810, 811 (9th
Cir. 2005); Bartlett v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mishra,
979 F.2d 301, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. $359,500 in U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 930, 93536 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Gregg 612 F.2d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Boucher,
509 F.2d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Marquez, 424 F.2d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 1970); Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F.
Supp. 2d 1289, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2011); United States v. Aldrich, No. 8:07CR158, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11411 at *14 (D. Neb. Feb. 14, 2008); United States v. Barnes, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53245 at *17
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007); United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612-13 (N.D. Tex. 1999);
United States v. Hall, 751 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-85 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Sisson v. United States, 630 F.
Supp. 1026, 1034-35 (D. Ariz. 1986); United States v. Dover, 3 M.J. 764, 766 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
104. Listing of cases are on file with author. See, e.g., United States v. Le Tourneau, 534 F. Supp.
2d 718 (2008); United States. v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (2012).
105. There was a seventh case: Lambert v. Mun. Court of L.A. Cty., 53 Cal. 2d 690, 691 (1960);
however, this is the Lambert case sent back by the U.S. Supreme Court and dismissed due to a
finding of unconstitutionality of the underlying municipal code section. The six cases are: Abbott v.
City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 680, 689 (1960); University Heights v. O'Leary, 68 Ohio St. 2d
130, 133-36 (1981); Wolfv. State, 292 P.3d 512, 518 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012); State v. Buttrey, 651
P.2d 1075, 1081, 1083 (Or. 1982); State v. Binnarr, 400 S.C. 156, 167-68 (2012); State v. Chester,
82 Wash. App. 422, 428-30 (1996).
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ordinance under which Lambert, and the defendant in the case, were
convicted.106
A total of 25% of the state cases citing to Lambert where the
defendant did not prevail involved a sex offense. A total of 69% of the
sex offense cases involved sex offender registry offenses. just over 5% of
the state cases involved firearm offenses (compared to nearly 10% of
the federal cases).
C. Lambert's Use
This quick survey of cases citing to Lambert supports the view that
Lambert did not bring to an end "[o]ne hundred years of American
complacency in matters of mens rea... "107 Lambert has not been widely
used and has not acted as a protection against strict liability offenses or
acted to encourage greater care in the legislative drafting process.
Courts have continued to read the case narrowly and to be cautious
about applying Lambert beyond a few narrow cases. But what if Lambert
had lived up to the earlier hopes and promises? What might have
happened?
VI. LAMBERT AND MASS INCARCERATION
The Warren Court cannot be faulted for not predicting and acting to
prevent mass incarceration. Incarceration rates in the United States had
been fairly steady before and during the Warren Court era. There was
no history or experience of mass incarceration as incarceration numbers
did not start to dramatically climb until the 1970s, over a decade after
Lambert was decided.1o8 However, Lambert did not prevent or play a role
in moderating mass incarceration. As has been discussed, in practice,
Lambert has been read narrowly and has only prevented criminal
prosecution of cases when the defendant fails to act in a case under
circumstances where the duty to act is not obvious.109 But, what if
Lambert had been more widely applied? What if Frankfurter's fears had
been realized? Could a wider application of Lambert have prevented or
moderated mass incarceration? On the face of it, Lambert would not
have prevented the longer sentences or increased filing of cases that are
106. Abbott, 53 Cal. 2d at 689.
107. Mueller, supra note 5, at 1043.
108. See, e.g., Kang-Brown et al., supra note 6, at8.
109. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 457 n.288 (1993) and discussion in Low &Wood, supra note 4, at 1617.
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important contributors to mass incarceration.11o However, if Lambert
had been more widely and broadly applied, it could have changed the
political culture both in legislatures and in prosecutors' offices. As will
be discussed, the existing cultures of both of these institutions are
moving forces behind mass incarceration.
A. Local Legislatures
When the Supreme Court decided Lambert, it should have struck
fear, or at least concern, into the heart of the U.S. Congress and state
legislators around the country. There should have been concern that
newly drafted criminal laws would have to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. This would have meant, at the very least, taking a more serious
look at strict liability offenses and at notice requirements for all offenses.
There is no indication that Lambert had that impactil
In 1962, five years after deciding Lambert, the Court decided
Robinson v. California.112This was the second Warren Court decision that
sparked the hope that the Court would develop constitutional criminal
law.113 Robinson was not the next in a great line of cases. It was, instead,
a case that "downscaled... a revolutionary spark to a modest
principle."114
Both Lambert and Robinson seemed to sit on their own in isolation
and both failed to lead to more court decisions. This would have led any
legislator who might have been thinking about it to conclude there was
no reason to exercise caution before doing a serious review or overhaul
of existing criminal statutes. More importantly, in the 1970s, as the
widespread restructuring of penal codes started around the nation,
there was no reason to think the Court would step in to limit what was
declared a crime, or to limit the increasing punishment ranges. The
Warren Court, through Lambert and Robinson, had the opportunity to
start a process to check legislative power and could have helped to
prevent the seemingly unchecked and widespread criminal code
changes that started under the War on Crime and continued under the
110. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration:Reforming the
Law to Reduce ProsecutorialPower in Plea Bargaining,15 U. MD. L. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS
191, 199-200 (2015) [hereinafter Alkon, Reversing Mass Incarceration].
111. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47,57-58 (2008).
112. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
113. ERIK LUNA, The Story ofRobinson: From Revolutionary ConstitutionalDoctrine to Modest Ban
on Status Crimes, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 47, 50 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013).
114. Id.
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War on Drugs.115 Legislators around the country increased the numbers
of acts that were crimes, increased the number of strict liability offenses,
increased the number of enhancements (use of a gun, committing a
crime within 100 yards of a school, etc.), and increased the range of
potential sentences, including increasing the number of offenses that
could be charged as either a felony or misdemeanor.116 These changes in
the laws were and continue to be significant drivers of mass
incarceration.
B. Prosecutors
According to John Pfaff, the single biggest reason for increased
incarceration rates since 1990 is an increase in the percentage of felony
filings per arrest.117 However, it is unclear why prosecutors are filing a
larger percentage of cases. I would suggest that one reason is because
they can. For decades, the political message of our larger society was to
encourage more incarceration and to look at prison as the solution for a
wide range of societal ills. Legislators increased prosecutorial power by
passing laws that gave prosecutors more discretion. 118 Prosecutors can
now decide whether to file a case with largely similar facts as a
misdemeanor or a felony.119 Prosecutors can decide to add or strike
enhancements as part of a plea deal.120 In the decades following Lambert,
legislators around the country gave wider and wider discretion to
prosecutors through revised criminal codes.121 More discretion has
meant more power. This power has been largely unchecked. If
prosecutors were concerned that crimes would need to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, that might have acted as a check on their power.
Any check on prosecutorial power might have meant a change in
115. Gershowitz, supra note 111, at 57-59 Yet, that rigorous oversight did not come to pass....
[S]ince Powell, it is nearly impossible to find a non-capital case in which the Court has restricted
legislatures' power to criminalize.").
116. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court's Failureto Fix Plea Bargaining:The Impact
ofLafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 585-87 (2014).
117. John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA.ST. U. L. REv. 1239, 1242
(2012).
118. See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 116, at 587 ("Structural changes in penal codes around the
country gave prosecutors more choices when deciding how to charge an offense and what offers to
make; these legislative changes have often been made precisely to give prosecutors more
'bargaining chips."').
119. See, e.g., Alkon, Reversing Mass Incarceration,supra note 110, at 203-05 (recommending
that legislatures reduce the number of acts that can be charged as either a felony or misdemeanor,
to reduce prosecutorial power).
120. Id.at192.
121. See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 116, at 585-87.
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prosecutorial culture that might have reigned in the increased filing
rates.
VII. WHAT CRIMES MIGHT BE DIFFERENTIF LAMBERT HAD LIVED UP
TO ITS PROMISE?
Criminal laws are rarely subjected by the courts to serious
constitutional scrutiny. What if they were? What if the various theories
of what Lambert stood for had been the beginning of meaningful
restrictions on legislative power to add enhancements and strict liability
offenses? If Lambert had been the first in a line of cases holding criminal
laws up to true constitutional scrutiny, the following acts might not have
become crimes or led to serious sentencing enhancements, or penal
codes might have been drafted more narrowly.
A. Repeat Offender Statutes
Longer prison terms are one factor contributing to mass
incarceration. Habitual offender statutes, including "three strikes and
you are out" statutes, are a factor in long prison terms. However,
habitual offender statutes existed at the time of Lambert, which is one
reason that Justice Clark wanted to be sure that Lambert was narrowly
decided-so those statutes would not be invalidated.122
Habitual offender statutes were meant to deal with the problem of
recidivism. Under this theory, if a defendant re-offends, he should be
punished more heavily to encourage him not to keep re-offending or, in
the case of more serious criminal behavior, to protect society from those
who keep committing crimes.
But what if Lambert had been decided on the broader grounds that
Clark feared? It is possible that it could have required that existing
habitual offender statutes be subjected to greater scrutiny, and some
might have been invalidated. It is also likely thatlaws such as California's
"three strikes and you are out" would not have passed muster. The U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the California law, holding
that it was not cruel and unusual punishment.123 If Lambert had been
more broadly written, would other arguments have worked? Could
defendants have successfully argued that they did not have notice that
prior convictions could carry the severe consequences of the three
122. See discussion supra pt II.
123. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
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strikes law and therefore at least convictions pre-dating the law and
possible notice should not be able to be used?
B. Strict Liability Statutes
This is the large category of crimes that the early Lambert scholars
hoped Lambert would invalidate. If Lambert had done what they
predicted, it would have prevented the large increase in strict liability
offenses. As the early scholars hoped, Lambert could have had the impact
of requiring legislators to draft clearer mens rea standards into
legislation and would have subjected existing laws to more serious
scrutiny.124
C. Sexual Offender Registry
Sex offender registry laws were created so that communities would
be aware of sex offenders in their midst, reasoning that the community
would be safer if sex offenders were known. Some states had sexual
offender registry laws dating back to the 1940s and 1950s.125 However,
twenty-six states passed their laws in just a two-year period between
1994-1996. Beginning in 1994, Congress passed a series of federal laws
requiring sex offenders to register.126 As was discussed above, a number
of the cases citing to Lambert have been sex offender registry cases.
Defendants are routinely advised about the need to register if they are
convicted of a crime that requires sex offender registration. Defendants,
therefore, do not get relief under the narrow wording of Lambert. For
example, state courts have held that sex offender registry statutes were
constitutional without an element of criminal intent.127
What if Lambert had been decided on broader omission to act
grounds? Is it possible that these laws would not have passed scrutiny?
Sex offender laws have had other serious consequences that might have
been mitigated or prevented if Lambert could have been used to
invalidate, instead of uphold, them. Sex offenders may not be able to find

124. See discussion supra pt Il1.

125. Scott Matson & Roxanne Lieb, Sex Offender Registration,A Review of State Laws, WASHINGTON
STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, at 5 (July 1996), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1227.

126. Legislative History of Sex Offender Registration and Notification, OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER
SENTENCING, MONITORING,

APPREHENDING,

REGISTERING, AND TRACKING,

legislation.htm.
127. State v. Watts, 41 So. 3d 625, 638 (La. Ct App. 2010).

https://www.smart.gov/
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housing.128 Juvenile sex offenders have been required to register for life
for offenses such as "sexting"-arguably an excessive punishment for
the offense.129 This offense, as an act of omission, could have been
invalidated on constitutional grounds if Lambert had been more broadly
decided.
D. Gun Offenses
Some laws prevent certain types of people from possessing
firearms. Felons, for example, are prohibited from possessing
handguns.30 Would a different Lambert have invalidated these offenses?
Given how few laws exist that restrict gun ownership in this country, and
the narrow categories for these restrictions, a more broadly worded
Lambert might not have had much of an impact here. It has also been
viewed as an issue of notice and might have led to more careful
advisements so that anyone who might fall into a prohibited category
would have been fully advised, thereby preventing prosecutions of those
who were not given adequate notice.
E. Voting While a Felon
Crystal Mason voted in the November 2016 presidential
elections.131 However, Ms. Mason was ineligible to vote under Texas law
as she was still on supervised release from an earlier felony
conviction.132 Under the law, Ms. Mason could only be found guilty of the
crime of illegal voting if she "knew" she was not eligible to vote.133 Ms.
Mason said that she did not know that she was not eligible to vote. As
Ms. Mason said, when she was placed on supervised release, "[t]hey tell
you certain things like you can't be around a felon, you can't have a gun.

128. Although housing issues may also exist due to restrictions such as prohibiting defendants
from being within a certain distance of a school.
129. See, e.g., Sex Offender Registries: Should Kids Be Listed?, USA TODAY May 1, 2013, https://

www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/01/sex-offender-registries/2125699/.
130. Seee.g., 18U.S.C. §922(g) (2018).
131. Anna M. Tinsley & Deanna Boyd, Convicted Felon Indicted on Illegal Voting Charge in Tarrant
County, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM Mar. 1, 2017, https://www.star-telegram.com/news/
politicsgovernment/election/article135748503.html.
132. Id.
133. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.33(a) (2011) (a second-degree felony carried a maximum sentence of

twenty years in prison); TEX.ELEC.CODE § 64.012(a)(1) (2010); TEX.ELEC. CODE § 64.012(b) (2010)
(a person who "votes or attempts to vote in an election in which the person knows the person is not
eligible to vote" has committed the crime of illegal voting which is a second-degree felony).
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No one actually said, 'Hey, you can't vote this year."'134 Ms. Mason
brought her identification to the polling place, but her name was not on
the list.135 According to Ms. Mason, one of the poll workers encouraged
her to fill out a provisional ballot and walked her through the process.
Ms. Mason did not carefully read the ballot herself and did not see
anything about not being able to vote if she was on supervised release.136
Ms. Mason voted with the provisional ballot She later received a letter
telling her that her vote was not counted, but with no explanation as to
why. Ms. Mason was later arrested and charged. Ms. Mason waived her
right to a jury trial and was convicted through a bench trial.137 The judge
sentenced her to five years in prison.
Ms. Mason's case made the national headlines. It was one of only a
few criminal prosecutions for illegal voting nationwide. Ms. Mason's case
was couched in the following political rhetoric, both nationally and
statewide, that illegal voting "'must be stopped' and "'we need every

tool to go after

it."'138

Ms. Mason's case is on appeal. She lost her first motion for a new
trial. Ms. Mason's lawyers have not cited or looked to Lambert v.
California for relief139 What if Lambert had been decided on broader
grounds? Voting laws are complicated. Ms. Mason's defense is
complicated by the fact that she signed a provisional ballot that clearly
stated that anyone on conditional release is not eligible to vote.140 Ms.
Mason maintains that she did not read before signing. Ms. Mason was
not told at the time of her sentence, or when she was put on supervised
release, that she would not be eligible to vote. Could Lambert have
134. Tinsley & Boyd, supra note 131.
135. Id.
136. The language on the provisional ballot, which Ms. Mason said she did not read, states, "I am
a registered voter of this political subdivision and in the precinct in which I'm attempting to vote
and have not already voted in this election (either in person or by mail). I am a resident of this
political subdivision, have not been finally convicted of a felony or if a felon, I have completed all of
my punishment including any term of incarceration, parole, supervision, period of probation, or I
have been pardoned." (on file with Author).
137. Sarah Sarder, Texas Felon Who 'Didn'tEven Want to Go Vote' Gets Prison Time for Voting
Illegally, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 29, 2018, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/
20 18/0 3/2 9 /texas-felon-wh o-didn-t-even-want-to-go-vote-gets-p rison-time-for-voting-illegally/
138. Tinsley & Boyd, supra note 131.
139. Brief for Appellant at iv-vi, Mason v. State, http://www.search.txcourts.gov/
searchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionlD=ae019747-5045-479e-acf9-91c3d893da4f&coa=coa02&DT=
Brief&MedialD=fd9a3c87-066d-489e-a0bc-e09121a4009b (Tex. App. Nov. 19, 2018) (No. 02-1800138-CR); Appellant's Reply Brief at ii-v, Mason v. State, https://www.search.txcourts.gov/
SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionlD=909c4356-642a-4e4f-980d-941280dlfcd
6&coa=coaO2&DT=Brief&MedialD=cb887f3c-a289-4c5d-9ce4-5906374367fO
(Tex. App. July 1,
2019) (No. 02-18-00138-CR).
140. Tinsley & Boyd, supra note 130.
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required notice to defendants who lose their voting rights before they
can be prosecuted for illegal voting? What about notice regarding other
collateral consequences of the conviction, such as not being allowed to
possess a firearm?
VIII. CONCLUSION
One Supreme Court case does not have the power to change
everything. One case on the right issue does, however, have the power
to change the direction of our legal system in fundamental ways.
Lambert was a case that could have led to fundamental changes. Perhaps
if Lambert had been more clearly written, it could have had that impact
However, the majority of the Court was not ready for Lambert to have
that more clear and larger impact.141 In the end, Douglas wrote the
opinion that would garner the necessary votes at the time.142 Lambert's
lack of clarity was combined with the majority of the Court's
unwillingness to make Lambert the first case in a series developing
constitutional criminal doctrine. The Court did not follow up on Lambert
in future decisions and allowed it to sit on its own. Unfortunately, a case
that could have had a serious impact in shaping criminal law practice for
generations has instead perhaps had its largest impact as an interesting
case to discuss with first year criminal law students.

141.
142.

Brooke II, supra note 23, at 281-88.
Id.

